Summer 2015 Edition

[Martin Edwards]

The latest edition of ADF-Telegraph is now on-line at;
http://www.adf-gallery.com.au/newsletter/A...0Vers%20Fin.pdf
Thanks to Gordon Birkett and John Bennett

[batman]

A great article there by Gordy: "The Malaya Emergency and the start of Konfrontasi: their input on RAAF Re-equipment Decisions 1950/60's: Part 1".

This is an area not covered in such detail before. Great research, could be a book in this subject !

[Warhawk]

Thanks Batman,
You ain't seen nothing,.....Late 1965 78 Wing Sabre Combat Patrols, and scrambles on AURI Aircraft and helios...Borneo/Kalimantan


Opened a Pandora's box for Part three it seems,......currently threading the Canberra Replacement saga,.........the RAAF indeed got a shock when the Budget Committee said on 7th October 1963 no to their RA-5C choice, then on little Gordy's 5th Birthday, through talk and ex Ford salesmanship and gifted Robert McNamara, ordered the inconceivable No One Choice, the TFX/F-111A

Anyways,..framing up the next exciting "unknown parts"

Even talks of new Navy Carrier !! Harahhh

:blink:

[Luig]

Konfrontasi changed the demise of fixed wing carrier aviation (MELBOURNE was to become an all ASW helo carrier by the mid 1960s) to kickstart fixed wing again with the A4Gs & S-2Es etc.

[Luig]

Thanks for the good work on the RAN aircraft serials. For my records can the author of the RAN Serial Numbers article be identified please (John Bennett?) - or was it both - as per:

"Volume 5: Issue 4: Summer 2015 Editor and contributing Author: Gordon R Birkett, Major Author and Contributor; John Bennett"
_______________________

Also does anyone know more about this 'swap' aspect of RAN/RAAF Macchis and the reason for it? Vaguely I recall an RAN pilot from the late 1970s saying that a Macchi or two was not painted as per the 'royal blue/white' scheme whilst I recall that all RAN Macchis were in that scheme by 1974 (but I could be wrong of course).

"N14 – Macchi MB-326H. Naval acquisition of the Macchi was in batches between the Australian production of RAAF aircraft. After the RAAF received A7-072, Naval aircraft were N14-073/N13-078, then RAAF aircraft were A7-079/A7-083, followed by Navy’s N14-084/N14-087. Later some swapping of RAAF aircraft did occur at HMAS Albatross, and the A7 prefix was not always changed to N14." TIA

This post has been edited by Luig on Dec 5 2015, 01:25 PM

[Warhawk]

Sorry Luig,..

Originally was going to be a three part serial, so when "conjoined,...forgot the name. Pretty good work by Batman.

My bad in all cases, and will ensure on any future stories to put Writer's name at end, .........though on a face saving comment,... on the first page it does have "Story: THE LAST THREE - Part 2 Written by John Bennett @2015"

On the up,...I would like to canvas you in doing a few stories too Luig,.....and I promise that I'll add your name at the bottom. :)

Best
Gordy





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[Luig]

OK thanks - missed it by that much.

[Dave Masterson]

Yeah thanks Gordy..well done

[Warhawk]

Thanks Dave.

Best
Gordy

[Luig]

Having spent a decade plus making and editing and re-editing the 4.4Gb PDF available online and the various sundry PDFs I'm no longer in frame of mind for writing 'stories' as such. However they will be scattered amongst the 11,000+ PDF pages and not always acknowledged. Usually however any stories by others are noted with details etc.

A denizen of this forum whipped this RTF text into shape and I rattled on somewhat. See attached RTF/PDF - y'all are welcome to put it into the newsletter.

Otherwise I have typed/written/rewritten the same old warries on various online forums time and again to probably nil comprehension. Writing is not me forte.

IN THIS part of the forum apparently it is not possible - FOR ME - to add attachments? I was hoping to attach an .RTF file for youse convenience....

This post has been edited by Luig on Dec 7 2015, 02:42 PM

[Warhawk]

So in "F/A-18 Super Bug" "Bill" Shorten parlance, that's a Flat annoyed Why the Hell did he ask "NO". Chuckle.

Note: I get the impression that the owner of the parlance requires his parental consent when he applies himself to this forum, as he seems very single tracked at times, hence the "father approach" on my part.

That's AOK on the nil contributions to the Telegraph, Luig and;.... I'd like to express that I always enjoy your "in depth" rtf formatted details/historical and your posts. At least keep that up.

This place is richer for your contributions,..at least I feel that way, Matie

Meanwhile the ship sails on

Best
Gordy



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[Luig]

NOw that is a thot. The RAN hysterical threads have a lot of RTF stuff these days so why not use that word salad? I cannot add an attachment on this part of the forum but can do so on the more usual parts. I'm baffled. Meanwhile here is the catapult text:

A4G ‘Catshot’ — HMAS Melbourne
For most of the A4G Skyhawk and S2E/G Tracker era, HMAS Melbourne used a steam catapult rebuilt mostly from parts bought from the Royal Canadian Navy after its last carrier, HMCS Bonaventure, paid off in July 1970. While the precise length of that system remains unclear, a VF-805 pilot from Melbourne’s last cruise with embarked A4Gs recalls being advised that the stroke within was 90-100 feet. [Also I have read - later - that parts from USS Coral Sea were in the mix.]

Reliable flight deck crew and shipyard sources state that the cat was built in sections eight feet long. There was a pre-Bonaventure suggestion to lengthen Melbourne’s bow so as to install two more sections. However, the Navy Office boffins calculated that the bow could not support the extra load, and no changes were made until the Canadian system became available. The Bonaventure’s cat was a new-build, as she had undergone a recent and very extensive refit to prolong her service life for another planned, and subsequently cancelled, five years. In the absence of a verifiable figure, it seems reasonable to estimate the overall cat length at between 100 and 110 feet.

An A4G launching from HMAS Melbourne was catapulted to the end of the track in one to 1.5 seconds. Pilot testimony differs in this figure. The cat had an inconsistency but it worked out to an end speed of approximately 115 knots groundspeed, relative to the ship, although at least one pilot recalls this routinely being a higher speed. Add the speed of Wind Over Deck (WOD) and you have a flying speed of 140 knots if the WOD is 25 knots. The WOD consists of ship speed into wind and the natural wind itself coming over the flight deck. It was calculated that 25 knots WOD was ideal, although this required at least three knots of natural wind and the Melbourne to rattle-and-hum her way to maximum speed of 22 knots. She was not always capable of this.

To my recollection, the A4G setting for the catapult was always the same, as long as the specified flying speed was adequate for weight and conditions. This was regardless of the aircraft’s All Up Weight (AUW). In tropical waters high temperatures and nil wind were prevalent, and the whole launch dynamic required more than usual finessing of aircraft AUW. In this case the AUW was reduced, or the ship would go searching for natural wind. In calm conditions wind lanes are visible at a distance so the ship would steam full speed for them and hope the WOD would be sufficient.

Having the same ‘whack’ meant that low weight launches were a physical shock. The low AUW aircraft end speed would be much higher than a more normal weight launch. Low AUW launches were standard during deck landing qualifications, when the aircraft would arrest at low landing arrest weight and then immediately launch at that low (maximum arrest) weight. The physical effect of a pilot’s first catshot was literally breathtaking (similar to a thump in the chest with a closed fist).

The A4G was stressed longitudin­ally to 9 Gs. Pilots were told to allow for the stresses of the catshot. One pilot recalls that in peacetime this was limited to 5.5 G. Simple physics equations show that length, time and end speed were optimised for launch at about 6 G. However, due to reductions in projected airframe life that constant 6 G catshots would have caused, this was restricted to ‘war only’ launches.

An untamed steam catapult could break anything, but the power was always controlled by procedures and machinery. The tamed cat was fired by an NCO at his control station inside the howdah, who took his instruction from the cat officer on deck via hand signals. If any devices failed or correct operating procedures were not followed by the cat team, then a ‘cold cat’ was possible, with disastrous consequences for aircraft and aircrew. Also, if the holdback mechanism failed with the aircraft at full ‘military’ power and no catapult thrust, then the aircraft could neither reach flying speed nor could it brake to a halt on the slippery 100 feet of deck in front of it. Zero-Zero ejection seats were, and are, good for this situation!

I heard stories of RAN A4Gs being cross-decked with HM ships Eagle and Hermes during their final cruises to Australian waters in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Those ships’ longer cats created a lot of excess airspeed for the A4G at the end of the shot — there was a limit to how much the cat itself could be throttled back for the Skyhawk. Thus, for low AUW aircraft long catapults built for heavier aircraft were slightly problematic.

Generally the Melbourne cata­pult was adequate except in certain circum­stances as outlined. A heavy AUW A­4G shot in minimal launch conditions would rotate off the catapult but do nothing much for a few seconds whilst it gathered independent flying speed. At the other extreme, in some videos it is possible to see the low AUW A4G ‘leap’ into the air off the cat track.

In heavy seas a launch had to be timed so that the cat was fired as the bow started to rise on the swell. The optimum position for the bow was with the stern at maximum rise and ‘starting down.’ Simply, the bow had to be moving upwards. Being launched while the bow was going down into the swell was not something to contemplate for the few seconds between saluting the Flight Deck Officer and the actual catshot.

There was a stated delay of 1.25 seconds between the howdah engineer pushing the button and the cat firing, and the cat officer had to allow for this in his final signal. The RAN used Royal Navy signals for flight deck procedures, and the signal for launch ‘go’ was to end the wind-up, bend down and touch the deck.

Sometimes the shot delay was longer than a few seconds, for one of a multitude of reasons. The A4G rotated naturally to the correct angle of attack off the catapult by the pilot allowing the stick to come back into his stomach — we held our hand there to catch the stick while holding on to a launch bar and throttle to ensure that the throttle did not reduce during launch. There is at least one story of an A4G being launched into the swell such that the wheels skimmed the sea surface for a few seconds. In this scenario the A4G would have been in the ‘ground effect air cushion,’ being the interaction of wings with the water surface.
PJT with editing by Ian Hunter

This post has been edited by Luig on Dec 7 2015, 10:23 PM

[Blackcat]

Amazing work Gordon and John!

I can appreciate the effort it takes to research those articles. I've been trying to write an article on the development/deployment of ASV in RAAF Catalinas but it's taking me years.