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> Loss of Skyhawk 885
Nick Thorne
Posted: Sep 23 2013, 10:10 PM
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I was a member of 816 when this aircraft was lost. The info in the aircraft history is not quite correct - at least to my recollection. The history states that the loss was due to a premature hold back failure, a "break out" as they were called. This suggestion was made by some at the time, but had this been the case, then all the pilot would have had to do was apply the brakes. Examination if the flight deck immediately after the loss, showed two very black skid marks either side of the catapult. I saw those marks myself and there can be no doubt the brakes were applied. SBLT David Baddams "Blemish" had indeed applied the brakes, but there was a whole lot more happening.

In fact this event caused quite a stir on the war canoe when it happened in a number of ways. Firstly, for reasons never determined, the dump valve had somehow closed allowing steam pressure to build up through the open carrot valve from the steam collectors directly to the catapult. Eventually the steam pressure grew to the level that it broke the hold back, but was no where near enough to launch the aircraft. That was entirely the purpose of the dump valve - to stop that from happening. However, the pressure was well more than enough to push the A4 off the front. Speaking to Blemish in the mess afterwards, he said that his initial thoughts were a breakout so he applied the brakes and pulled back on the throttle, but then, as he put it, the front of the ship kept getting closer so he pulled the aircraft jettison handle.

Then several things unpleasant things occurred. The parachute got caught around the tail of the sinking aircraft and dragged Blemish under. He tried to release the Koch fittings to separate his harness from the chute, but was unable to. To make matters worse, he found that his emergency oxygen supply did not work and he was getting no air and thought to himself something like "well this must be it". Then a stroke of luck, whether it was his Mae-West buoyancy or whatever, but he did separate from the chute and then popped back to the surface to be picked up by the plane guard.

We had a few beers in the wardroom that night I can assure you.

After the accident the engineers pulled the catapult apart and compared it with the drawings. Apparently they found a few minor inconsistencies and put it back the way it was supposed to be. The catapult was out of action for 10 days. Some of us on 816 tried to get permission to make free deck launches, but the powers that be would not be in it. Party poopers!
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Luig
Posted: Sep 23 2013, 11:52 PM
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It would be nice if this forum accepted small PDFs as attachments. I'll try.... Not sure - anyway the PDF file is too large at 3.5Mbs. Making a graphic out of the three pages is impractical for reading as a graphic so I'll put it on SkyDrive/GoogleDrive on the 'SpazSinbad' pages. The main PDF at 4.4GB is a lot to digest so these three pages are only a small example of what the overall PDF contains.

The PDF is part of a report written by CMDR John Crawley about the loss of 885 summarising the accident report with a lot of detail about the catapult (which I admit to not knowing a lot about). Also included is the pilot account and he is still around to question about what happened. At any rate I'll post the PDF as soon as. This is the title:

A Bad Month for the Bean-Counters by CMDR John Crawley, RAN (retd)

RAN TOUCHDOWN Magazine 3/97 (I wonder if these old magazines will ever find the web?). On Microsoft SkyDrive in the folder:
FAA A-4G Skyhawk RAN PDFs will be this PDF:

https://skydrive.live.com/?cid=cbcd63d63407...6340707E6%21119

Loss885reportA4GcatapultMalfunction21oct1980.pdf (3.5Mb)

The 3 page PDF is all graphic hence large file size.

https://drive.google.com/?authuser=0#folder...b0s4VWNERFJLQ2s

Same PDF on GoogleDrive in folder: A4G_Skyhawk_RAN_FAA_PDFs
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Luig
Posted: Sep 24 2013, 05:36 AM
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'Nick Thorne' makes a good point: "...the loss [of A4G 885] was due to a premature hold back failure, a "break out" as they were called. This suggestion was made by some at the time, but had this been the case, then all the pilot would have had to do was apply the brakes. Examination if the flight deck immediately after the loss, showed two very black skid marks either side of the catapult. I saw those marks myself and there can be no doubt the brakes were applied....".

There is a misunderstanding of what the pilot faces when at full power waiting to be catapulted down the 105 foot catapult track (which is often wet and perhaps a little slippery). "all the pilot (not an A4G pilot) would have had to do was apply the brakes." may be possible for a Tracker pilot (I do not know - never asked them) however an A4G pilot will not be able to stop the aircraft in this situation from going over the front end if the hold back fails when the A4G is at full power.

The video shows the aircraft nose being under strain going down as brakes applied. The Chief Artificer (head of maintainers on an RAN squadron) said the brakes were worn down in his estimation as it went over and yes there were skid marks. FlyCo was calling for the pilot Baddams to eject. He heard this whilst he had already made up his mind to eject and had initiated the successful ejection as the aircraft reached the end of the catapult track as shown.

An A4G did a manual fuel check on the runways at NAS Nowra at 85% engine RPM. The brakes at that power JUST held the aircraft. Wait too long for whatever reason (in formation all aircraft carried out actions together with the leader sometimes pausing at this high power setting to allow the others to carry out the check) and the pilot legs would shake with the effort whilst the aircraft would start to creep forward no matter what leg/foot effort applied to the brakes.

Having to firstly reduce the throttle at full power on the catapult meant firstly taking ones hand off the throttle / catapult grip combination to then only grasp the throttle to reduce it. That takes an amount of time. Factor in the time the engine takes to wind down from full power along with pilot reaction time to carry out this action whilst he is stomping down mightily on the ineffective brakes at this high power setting going down a 100-105 foot catapult track and you have no chance to do much except to see what Baddams was able to do in the dire circumstances.

His efforts to slow the aircraft took his bum off the seat as he stood on those brakes and he did not really get into the ideal ejection position as he pulled the alternate seat handle. My thoughts on the matter would have been in that situation - eject using the primary handle as soon as and not worry about braking. That would have been our brief. However every situation has subtle differences and I'm not faulting anyone for their actions. Our motto was:

IF IN DOUBT - PUNCH OUT. Being at full power on the catapult with any failure that allowed the aircraft to go forward as described was one such situation.

One can time the video (I'm not sure if the speed of the video is accurate) but one can see that there is little time available to do much at all because of the power of the A4G as described in conjunction with the ineffective brakes at that high power. Jet engines produce most power above that 85% RPM (I do not recall how much these days perhaps NATOPS gives an indication).

On the 6,000 foot runways (approx.) at NAS Nowra the aircraft was operated on the minimum required length according to NATOPS. The A4G pilot had to be extra careful about taxi speed (especially when heavy) due to the brakes not being as effective as perhaps the Sea Venom for example which had Girling Anti Lock brakes and were very effective at all speeds. The A4G on that tall undercarriage also had an alarming tendency to tip over when turning at more than a walking pace when taxiing. A clean A4G with full fuel would taxi too fast on a level stretch of taxiway at idle power (not so when heavily loaded though) so the brakes were always being tapped lightly so as to not go too fast. STOMPing on the brakes causes the nose to compress the nose oleo as we see on the 885 catapult failure video.

It was easy for new A4G pilots to blow a tyre at NAS Nowra if they mishandled the brakes on landing. Easy to do on a wet runway. What I'm describing is not such a great brake system on the aircraft - which by the way had no park brake - usual for USN aircraft at that time so that the brakes were not inadvertently actuated during a catapult event. Today the T-45C Goshawk pilot will have a tendency to have the brakes actuate if he does not carry out a special technique before catapulting. Every aircraft has idiosyncrasies. I have described the A4G inadequate brakes idiosyncrasy.

Upon landing on a runway the A4G spoilers actuated (when armed) as soon as the main oleos were compressed to actuate a 'squat' switch which controlled them otherwise. No airforce style landings please. Just drive down to touch down at optimum angle of attack was the technique. 'Smart' A4G pilots often (in high wind down the runway conditions) would use aero braking - keeping the nose up - but often COs/SPs would ban such things because there was the danger of making a mess of it, especially if there was a crosswind, and then if not enough wind speed, having to brake without enough runway when the nose came down to do so.

A4G pilots operated at NAS Nowra - especially in VC-724 - with the threat of dismissal if they caused a taxi accident. Blown tyres were a known problem but too many too often and probably the consequences would be dire. One taxied and used the brakes with extreme caution in an A4G.

This post has been edited by Luig on Sep 24 2013, 05:41 AM
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Nick Thorne
Posted: Sep 24 2013, 06:11 AM
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Thanks for posting that, Luig. It was good to see that my recollection was not all that far from the truth - after all these years! A very interesting read. I think that the bare statement "hold back failure" does not properly summarise the cause of the accident. If forced to summarise in a few words I would say something like "catapult procedural error" or just "catapult failure".
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Luig
Posted: Sep 24 2013, 07:03 AM
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Nick thanks for your input. Always good to have the recollections of those on the spot but as you say not everything was known straight after the event. And things were complicated. I will have to attempt to automatically get the text out of the graphic pages in the 3 page PDF download mentioned. I'm not up to typing so much after all these years of working on the 4.4GB PDF itself.

One thing perhaps not clear is that the A4G (and probably most carrier jets over the years) have a mechanism to help the pilot keep the throttle full forward at full power during the catapult launch forces attempting to force it back.

Firstly the A4G pilot winds the throttle fiction grip to FULL - meaning the throttle is almost LOCKED at whatever position the throttle is at the time. I'll have to check the exact sequence of events (it was now 42 years ago for me for my first catapult) but the throttle is at that 'LOCKED' position, also making it that much more difficult to reduce the throttle to idle without first reducing the throttle friction (a big wheel next to the throttle). So just one more thing to do; or perhaps sheer adrenalin power allows the pilot under stress to reduce the throttle to idle, without changing that 'friction lock'.

At the same time the throttle catapult grip is used (a bar which swings down in front of the throttle) so that at full power both the bar and the throttle can be grasped as one. However when the bar is down there is no distance between them, so that bar has to be flipped back up, to then grasp the throttle to reduce it. See what I mean? Not a lot of time travelling quickly - AT FULL POWER - down that short track. Blem was in a pickle and he did a good job to demonstrate he did all he physically could under the extreme circumstances and then it was time 'to do some "chair lifting"' as he puts it sometimes. :-)

I think Baddams mentions he had a briefing whilst that briefing cannot cover every circumstance it would have been cognisant of the recent loss of A4G 875 off the catapult because of engine failure.

I would be hard pressed to recall all my briefings before sorties. Not every one would mention a failure on the catapult however other emergencies would be covered and overall we had in mind earlier briefings or our own discussions/ cogitations about what to do in the event of a failure as experienced by our pilot in 885. It is always easy to be wise after the event. We can acknowledge again that he did an excellent job in a sterling effort to prevent the inevitable.

My backseat guess now long ago is that I sat on that catapult with a lot of thoughts but one impression remains - catapult failure - punch out. How would I know the catapult failed? After the unbelievable first experience it would be clear. If the catapult failed during my first catapult I would be a bit flummoxed but probably - hopefully - would have done the same thing and not worried about trying to save the aircraft. Again I stress I'm not faulting what the pilot attempted to do and no one else then, or later, had any negative thoughts about his actions. He gave it a good go but I hope it is clear nothing could be done.

I was lucky enough to talk about these issues, after my time onboard, with Barry Evans almost immediately after his catapult aircraft loss event, when he returned to NAS Nowra on survivor leave. Bloody hell time can be compressed under the experience of adrenalin. Ask me about hitting the ramp. :-)

This post has been edited by Luig on Sep 24 2013, 07:06 AM
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Luig
Posted: Sep 24 2013, 04:19 PM
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TOUCHDOWN Magazine 3/97 [RAN FAA Safety Magazine]
A BAD MONTH FOR THE BEAN-COUNTERS! by CMDR John Crawley, RAN (Rtd)
LOSS OF SKYHAWK N13-154906 [A4G 885]
NOT quite three weeks after the loss of Skyhawk 875, on 21 October 1980 Skyhawk N13-154906 (885) was lost at sea from HMAS MELBOURNE during catapult operations. The aircraft sank in 4,000 metres of water in position 5° 10.9' N, 78° 49.2' E and was not recovered. The pilot, SBLT David Baddams, ejected and was rescued uninjured.

Tuesday 21 October 1980 was the first day of scheduled fixed-wing flying operations following the Fleet visit to Colombo. A period of eight days had elapsed since the last fixed-wing flying was completed.

On the day, up until the time of the accident involving Skyhawk 885, two Skyhawks and one Tracker had been launched. Shortly after completion of that launch serial the morning watch of catapult personnel was relieved.

Skyhawk 885, which was flown on the first launch of the day had been inspected and refuelled in preparation for the next launch, which was scheduled for 1005 hrs local (EF). The pilot, SBLT David Baddams takes up the story.

Pilot's account of accident
Pre-flight briefing began at 0830 for a two-aircraft launch with LEUT Mike Maher as flight lead and myself as No 2. The sortie was briefed to be FRU and INTEX and was very thorough due to us both not having flown for seven days.

At the completion of the formal brief a standard squadron brief was carried out by Mike. He discussed all relevant factors such as fuel load, take-off time, departure details, radio procedures, sortie profile, RTB etc. The briefing was concluded with a comprehensive emergency section taking special note of ship-oriented emergencies such as hold-back failure, 'soft catapult shot' (how appropriate), broken arrestor gear, hydraulic problems etc.

I had also been recently quizzed on procedures for a soft catapult shot and hold-back failure by LEUT Andy Sinclair (Squadron AWI).

We suited up forty minutes prior to planned take-off time to enable plenty of time for a precise pre-flight actions and for the completion in slow time of all relevant checks and procedures.

Strapping-in was carried out normally with emphasis placed on tightening the harness lap straps due to problems I had experienced on arrestment in a previous sortie with loose straps.

Cockpit checks and start-up were completed without incident, all indications being normal. After-start checks were also completed and the aircraft systems were operating normally. During the final external checks on the aircraft I completed two sets of thorough TAFFIOHHHC checks as well as two sets of placard pretake-off checks. At the thumbs-up given by ground personnel I acknowledged their signal and radioed 'On deck' to Flyco some five minutes after Mike in 876.

I was taxied first, the brakes operated normally as did the nose wheel steering. The taxi to the catapult chocks was uneventful.

On reaching the chocks I noticed ground personnel observing something at the rear of my aircraft. Meanwhile, I selected full flap and lowered the catapult grip. The chocks were lowered prior to the shuttle being brought back and after a short period of time I was given a thumbs-up and green flag from the Flight Deck Officer (FDO). He waved me forward and tension was taken on the catapult. I noted that in tensioning, instead of several small jolts pulling the aircraft nose down, there was only one large jolt. However, this had occurred to me before and I assumed it was a relatively normal occurrence. The FDO then waved his flag indicating a wind-up to full power. I selected full power and ran through the pretake-off vital actions written on my knee board. The engine instruments were all indicating normal, I rechecked full flaps, catapult grip down and selected full throttle friction with my right hand. At this stage I transferred my gaze to the other side of the cockpit and noticed that my horizontal stabiliser trim was fractionally off 6° nose-up. Whilst correcting for this I experienced a jolt and realised I was moving along the deck. I immediately assumed a premature hold-back failure and retarded the throttle to idle and applied full brakes. This action seemed to have no effect so I moved my left hand to the lower ejection seat handle and pulled seemingly in conjunction with an 'Eject eject eject' call from FLYCO (Flying Control). I'm not sure whether it was FLYCO's prompting or my own decision that caused me to eject as both seemed concurrent.

My body posture at ejection, given the time available was as close to optimum as possible. The lower handle pulled out very easily. I felt pain from the initial ejection shock, I suspect this was due to the heavy braking raising my bottom slightly from the seat. It seemed that, instantaneously after the initial ejection shock, the ballistic spreader inflated the chute. Immediately after this my next action was to grab for the two dinghy release handles; I grabbed them and pulled.

The next conscious thought I had was of being in the water facing the direction of the ship's travel. I don't remember sinking on initial entrance into the water. I looked right and saw the ship about 20 ft away with the last bits of my aircraft submerging about half way between me and the ship. I then inflated the Mae West and tried to release the parachute risers, but the latter proved unsuccessful - and then I was hit by the ship's wake.

It seemed now as though I was being pulled head first down into the water. I noticed that I couldn't breathe and my efforts to release the parachute Koch fittings were futile. I soon became panicky and started flailing wildly, pulling at anything my hands happened to come into contact with. After what seemed like an eternity something jerked free - as if I had broken away from it. My swimming for the surface was quite frantic as I still was unable to breathe.

When I broke surface I removed my oxygen mask and discarded it. Although I still experienced some difficulty in breathing I eventually got some air. But I was still in a lot of trouble, hopelessly entangled in my parachute risers. The SAR diver, Rick Newman (who had rescued my boss three weeks earlier), then magically appeared from behind and started to untangle me.

At this stage I began to relax as I felt very safe with him there. He talked me through releasing all my Koch fittings (RSSK8 seat pack included) and then the oxygen hose. After this he was finally able to clear the parachute and let down my Mae West to enable the winch strops (double) to be fitted, and we were then winched up together. I had to take some of my weight on my hands during the hoist as my lower back was hurting. Once in the helo Rick and the aircrewman (Leading Seaman Ray Cully) proceeded to remove my torso harness. Once back on the ship I was placed in a stretcher and carried off to Sick Bay.

Isolating the accident cause
With plenty of witnesses to the accident, it soon became apparent that, unlike the accident involving Skyhawk 875 earlier in the month, a perfectly serviceable aircraft had been despatched off the end of the ship.

The BOI was quickly satisfied that the pilot was properly briefed and authorised, and that he was competent to complete the flight. The Board was further satisfied that the aircraft was fully serviceable and that the weather was suitable. Clearly, something had gone horribly wrong with the catapult launching process.

Normal aircraft start-up occurred at 0950 and the aircraft subsequently taxied forward towards the catapult at 1003. The catapult loading sequence was delayed momentarily as the catapult crew were not ready to accept the aircraft; however, very shortly thereafter the catapult crew indicated to FLYCO that they were ready to proceed.

The Assistant Flight Deck Officer (AFDO) then took charge of the launch. Aircraft loading varied from normal in that it was taxied into the catapult chocks, the hold-back fitted and then the chocks lowered with the shuttle forward. The shuttle was then retracted, the launching bridle attached and the tensioning sequence completed.

The AFDO, having received visual confirmation from the catapult CPO that the catapult was ready for the launch, then proceeded to signal the pilot to wind up to military power. Then, with the aircraft at military power, but with no launch acceptance signal having been made by the pilot to the AFDO, the tension bar parted and the shuttle commenced towing the aircraft down lhe track.

The rate of aircraft acceleration was abnormally slow and it soon became apparent that, irrespective of any pilot action, the aircraft would leave the flight deck well below flying speed. FLYCO, rapidly assessing the situation, transmitted to the pilot to eject. Pilot ejection was initiated just as the aircraft nose wheel dipped onto the bridle recovery platform and was followed by normal seat separation and parachute deployment.

It was apparent to the Bridge staff that the pilot, suspended in his parachute, could land either on the port forward extremities of the flight deck or very close to the port bow. Timely and appropriate actions were initiated by the Bridge staff to minimise any further danger to the pilot.

The aircraft departed the flight deck, slewing slightly to starboard before impacting the water close to the bow and subsequently passed quite close down the port side of the ship.

Pilot splashdown occurred on the port side in close proximity to both the ship and the aircraft. A few parachute shroud lines were observed to be draped over the aircraft tail plane, the parachute canopy still partially inflated.

As the SAR helicopter, piloted by SBLT Dick Chartier, manoeuvred for the rescue, the downed pilot was observed to be suddenly jerked underwater, – although his Mae West and dinghy were inflated – surfacing some seconds later. The SAR diver, Rick Newman, was 'despatched' to assist in what proved to be a difficult recovery due to the tangled parachute shroud lines. After disentangling the pilot, a double-lift recovery followed and the pilot was returned safely onboard after spending about six minutes in the shark-infested waters.

The aircraft sank a few seconds after impact with the water and, although the rescue destroyer HMAS PERTH, was quickly on the accident scene, nothing of value was salvaged.

The catapult problem
Following completion of the morning's first launch, which had proceeded as planned, repair action was initiated by the forenoon watch to rectify a defect on the Flow Control Valve Bypass Valve. This necessitated the isolation of main steam to the catapult machinery space with a subsequent downgrading of catapult readiness to State 3.

Approximately half an hour before the next planned launch time, scheduled for 1005, the Aircraft Control Room (ACR) was advised of a predicted delay of 15 minutes. Shortly thereafter, a telephone discussion between FLYCO and the Catapult Officer refined this estimate, as it appeared that the planned launch time was likely to be met. However, the repair of the bypass valve took longer than anticipated and steam remained isolated until the catapult was brought up to State 2 at approximately 0955.

In the short time remaining considerable activity was taking place in the catapult machinery space to bring the catapult up to the correct state for launching aircraft. The Catapult Officer, having participated in some of these activities, departed the machinery space for the flight deck leaving the Console Operator to complete the necessary actions. The Catapult Officer took up his position on the flight deck at about 1003 and communications were established with FLYCO. Two minutes later communications were also established with the Console Operator and aircraft launch particulars passed.

Almost immediately aircraft loading and tensioning drills were initiated and subsequently completed. However, prior to final launch actions, the aircraft suffered the premature breakout causing the resultant accident at 1006.30.

Diagnosis of cause or causes
The Board considered that the possible causes of the accident fell within the following general groups:

• aircraft failure or aircrew error;
• failure of tension bar or holdback equipment;
• failure of catapult tensioning equipment;
• premature firing of catapult; and
• shuttle break-out as a result of a build-up of steam pressure behind the pistons.

1. Aircraft failure or aircrew error. Possibilities investigated included:

• the pilot failing to exercise appropriate control of the aircraft during the catapult loading sequence, specifically the snatching of the holdback thereby creating an undue and excessive load on the tension bar leading to subsequent failure;
• other pilot drill errors which could have resulted in either the aircraft being improperly configured or in an inappropriate running condition to complete a safe catapult launch; and
• aircraft unserviceability.

On the available evidence the Board was able to quickly discount all of the above as possible causes.

2. Failure of the tension bar or holdback equipment.
The holdback group consists of the holdback tension bar, aircraft holdback assembly and the flight deck holdback rack. A failure in this group would cause the aircraft to move down the catapult under its own power, leaving both the bridle and shuttle behind. Verbal evidence, supported by filming of the launch, clearly showed that the aircraft was towed down the catapult by the shuttle. The Board therefore was able to discount failure in this group as the cause of the accident.

3. Failure of the catapult tensioning equipment. A failure in this equipment would lead to excessive tensioning forces being transmitted through the shuttle to the aircraft, resulting in a premature tensile fracture of the tension bar. This in tum would enable the aircraft, grab and shuttle to travel down the track, but under this condition the grab and shuttle would have stopped after approximately five metres.

Inspection showed that the grab remained in the aft battery position and the shuttle travelled approximately three quarters along the catapult stroke. Further evidence showed that the bridle tensioning cylinder was correctly charged to 500 psi. Therefore the Board discounted the possibility of this type of failure as an accident cause.

4. Premature firing of the catapult. This group includes drill errors by flight deck and catapult crews which would result in the catapult firing button being depressed prematurely. Such an occurrence would cause the launch valves to open initiating aircraft separation from the holdback, and catapult acceleration would be commensurate with, inter alia, catapult receiver steam pressure at the time of firing. The evidence showed that the catapult receiver pressure was approximately 300 psi both immediately before and after the accident. Additionally, the launching valves had remained closed throughout and the escapement had remained locked.

For these reasons the Board discounted premature firing of the catapult as the cause of the accident.

5. Shuttle breakout as a result of a build-up of steam pressure behind the power pistons. With the shuttle retracted it was possible for steam to enter the power cylinders behind the pistons which propel the shuttle. With the exhaust valve closed steam pressure could build up in his area, thereby imparting an increasing force on the shuttle which could then be transmitted to the holdback. At the point where the transmitted load was sufficient to fracture the tension bar and cause a breakout from the grab, the shuttle would no longer be restrained thereby permitting its acceleration down the catapult track.

The Board's inspection of the catapult after the accident clearly revealed:

• the holdback in place with the tension bar fractured normally;
• the grab at the aft end of the catapult (aft battery position); and
• the shuttle three quarters of the way down the catapult track.

This indicated that the premature breakout was caused by excessive steam pressure behind the power cylinder pistons.

What caused the steam pressure build·up?
Possible causes of a build-up in steam pressure included:

1. Receiver blowdown. Catapult receiver steam pressure being blown down with the shuttle retracted could generate the required pressure behind the pistons. This possibility was discounted as there was no evidence to indicate that a blowdown was initiated during this launch.

2. Pressure breaking valve. When operating, this valve closed automatically when the steam pressure in the exhaust manifold exceeded 10 psi. Increasing system pressure could be induced if this valve was not operating correctly or the mechanical gag was not removed to enable the valve to open. The mechanical gag which was attached to the console control key by a chain had to be removed for the console to be operated. Because the console was manned and operating at the time of the accident, the Board concluded that the Pressure Breaking Valve was capable of operating at the time of the accident.

3. Leaking launching valves. Leaking launching valves would cause receiver steam pressure to drop at a rate faster than normal. This was not supported by any evidence.

Moreover, post-accident examination of the valves showed them to be in good condition.

4. Launching valves opening. Opening of the launching valves would have caused a sudden and significant drop in receiver steam pressure. This was discounted as a possible cause since the evidence revealed:

• receiver steam pressure was very close to 300 psi both immediately before and after the accident;
• the launching valves were shut at the time of the accident; and
• the escapement had not been tripped.

5. Launching valves bypass valves. These valves, more commonly referred to as track steam valves, permitted regulated steam pressure to bypass the launching valves to keep the power cylinders warmed to the required operating temperature. A steam leak past these valves was eliminated as a possible cause when a post-accident inspection revealed them to be in good condition. However, with the track steam valves left open during the launch sequence, sufficient pressure could be introduced behind the power pistons and result in a premature breakout of the shuttle. There were four significant witnesses who attested to the fact that the track steam valves were open at the time of the accident.

From the following evidence the Board was able to refine the implications of track steam being applied during the loading and launching cycle:

• track steam was being applied during the entire loading and launching sequence at a pressure of 100-140 psi;
• there was sufficient receiver steam pressure (300 psi) to supply and maintain track steam;
• no attempt was made to close the valves immediately before or during the loading and launching sequence;
• the catapult control handle had been rotated from SAFE to STANDBY then COCKED at the correct times during the loading and launching sequences. Movement of this handle from SAFE to STANDBY automatically closed the exhaust valve and which remained closed in the COCKED position; and
• the track steam valves were closed by the Able Seaman machinery space hand after the accident occurred.

Accident cause
The Board concluded that the primary cause of the accident was the failure to close the track steam valves prior to going to the STANDBY condition.

When the catapult control handle was rotated to STANDBY the exhaust valve was automatically closed permitting a steam build-up which then induced the closure of the pressure breaking valve. Thus the track steam, which had no means of escape, caused a pressure build-up behind the power pistons sufficient to cause the shuttle to break out and tow the aircraft down the catapult track.

From the pilot's evidence it was apparent that his initial reactions to apply heavy braking and reduce power were appropriate, despite his assessment that a holdback failure had occurred. The Board recognised that this was a reasonable conclusion to draw bearing in mind the mere seconds involved and the limited sensations available to him. Notwithstanding any of the above, the Board believed that there was nothing the pilot could have done to avert the loss of Skyhawk 885.

Other aspects
As the Board's investigation progressed, certain drill errors by catapult crews became apparent:

1. Loading sequence. Firstly, the aircraft was cleared to taxi to the catapult prior to all the catapult crew being closed up. Secondly, the normal loading sequence for a half-cycle launch was not followed in that the loading chocks were lowered prior to shuttle retraction.

2. Sitrep. The Board believed that it was good engineering practice for the Catapult Officer to call for a sitrep on the state of the catapult machinery prior to the first planned launch of every serial. Additionally, the Board believed that the catapult crew was making every endeavour to meet the planned launch time. However, in doing so, certain vital checks were not carried out and a sitrep was not called for. Also, because a sitrep had not been called for, neither the Catapult Officer nor the Console Operator were fully aware of the catapult machinery state. As a result the shuttle was retracted without the main lubricating oil pump operating.

3. Launching readiness report. The Catapult Officer communicated to FLYCO that he was 'ready to go', thereby implying that the catapult and machinery were in every respect ready to launch aircraft. However, this was not the case as neither the Catapult Officer nor the Console Operator were fully aware of the machinery state. This error was further aggravated by the fact that the Console Operator was not in communication with the flight deck and was not in the console at the time the statement was made.

4. Manning of the catapult machinery space. While it was clear that all the machinery space personnel were closed up, as the repair took longer than anticipated all personnel were still involved in preparing the machinery when the order for shuttle retraction was given. Execution of this order caused routines to be rushed, drills omitted, and total awareness of the machinery state to become confused. No one in the machinery space was fully conversant with either the machinery state or the sequence of the launch cycle actually prevailing at the time the retract order was given.

5. Miscellaneous, catapult. As is often the case in accident investigations, 'side issue' shortcomings were identified by the Board, eg, in publications, including the Catapult Operations Manual and catapult electrical drawings.

6. Miscellaneous, aircraft. A study of the filming of the ejection sequence suggested that it was in all aspects normal. However, as was the case with the loss of Skyhawk 875 earlier in the month, critical survival aspects arose from the time the pilot splashed down in close proximity to the ship and aircraft until he was assisted by the SAR diver.

In summary
In summarising the accident the Board considered that it was caused by human error in that the track steam valves were not shut during the launching sequence. Additionally, they noted no less than six other errors during the attempted launch and, although each was not a direct cause of the loss of Skyhawk 885, the impact of their combined occurrence aggravated a deteriorating situation to a point where an accident was likely to happen.

The Board agreed that failure to close the track steam valves was an error of judgment brought about by the desire of the catapult crew to meet the planned launch time. This was compounded by the fact that at no time did either the Console Operator inform the Catapult Officer of the actual catapult machinery state nor did the Catapult Officer check by sitrep that the catapult was ready.

The defect rectification undertaken during the morning of the accident had two ramifications. Firstly, track steam was required to bring the catapult up to the required operating temperature since main steam had been isolated for approximately two hours. Secondly, the late completion of the defect rectification prevented the catapult crew from closing up in sufficient time to ensure a thorough and orderly preparation of the catapult for the impending launch. Therefore, time was allowed to become the governing factor to the detriment of procedure and hence safety.

And the cost?
In 1982, Skyhawks N13-155062 (875) and N13-154906 (885), complete with their engines, were written off for the princely sum of $A938,642 each.

This post has been edited by Luig on Sep 24 2013, 07:19 PM
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Brugal
Posted: Sep 27 2013, 01:25 AM
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Great story and doc's guys... very interesting material to read.

Well done.

Cheers
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Luig
Posted: Sep 27 2013, 08:48 AM
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Brugal,
There is a lot of 'supporting' information in the current 'finished' 4.4GB PDF about the RAN FAA and the A4G in particular. Just today I have started work on remaking what is now (for my editing purposes here) an unusable PDF into one 'able to be edited' version (a 'bad' page mucks everything up at moment - which I cannot delete - no one offers any usable advice online about how to get rid of it).

Anyway a new version which can now be edited requires a lot of 'putting the pieces back together again'. This will take a long time. However I'll take the opportunity to delete the less relevant info to retain only the 'how to deck land' and then the RAN FAA material - which will include these newly found items above.

The accident reports for the A4G are currently in the back of the present 4.4GB PDF online. Other reports such as the one for Ralph McMillan in TA4G 879 are available at the two websites - look for the side number PDF. I do not think I can reasonably convert this old roneoed print page PDF into text only, so it will likely remain 'as is'. However it will be one of the missing bits of info in the new RAN FAA A4G PDF.

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Nick Thorne
Posted: Sep 27 2013, 04:30 PM
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QUOTE (Luig @ Sep 27 2013, 08:48 AM)
The accident reports for the A4G are currently in the back of the present 4.4GB PDF online. Other reports such as the one for Ralph McMillan in TA4G 879 are available at the two websites - look for the side number PDF. I do not think I can reasonably convert this old roneoed print page PDF into text only, so it will likely remain 'as is'. However it will be one of the missing bits of info in the new RAN FAA A4G PDF.


Hi Luig, do you want me to try and convert this PDF for you? I have a few software tricks that might help - if they work, I'll let you know what I did! ;)

Nick

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Luig
Posted: Sep 27 2013, 07:03 PM
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Thanks Nick,
I have the latest Acrobat Pro 11 and I can test the new version coming along (but still early days - that is all I can say). I have not looked at the McMillan accident report for some time (when I had older versions of Acrobat). Acrobat 11 is very good for OCRing.

My method would be save the TIF / PDF pages as TIF at 300 dpi which is best for OCR in Acrobat. Either make them greyscale or black/white depending on result. Make a new PDF out of these new TIF files.

Then OCR in Acrobat 11. Usually trying to resave the PDF as RTF is not a good result - however selecting the text on the page via the mouse then copy / paste into an RTF file is quite good - there is more control how the blocks of text are saved.

The tedious part is the proofreading/error correction. Depending on input sometimes the output is not worthwhile so typing the text is more efficient.

Having spent a decade working on the 4.4GB PDF I'm reluctant to do anything the difficult way at this stage or anything at all now that I'm reworking the damn PDF again. Can't say when I'll be finished.

If you have a recent copy of the 4.4GB PDF from online the problem page is around page 4753 - it is clearly marked in the bookmark pane and either side of that page in the 'Kiwis at Nowra' section. If you can get rid of the blank tiny problem page and RETAIN THE BOOKMARKS (and the internal links) then that would be OUTSTANDING! :-)

I have a new file without the problem page but all the internal links are gone along with the bookmarks. As a side 'benefit' the file size increased by 40Mbs. Bugga. :-) I intended to delete material to add the new material as explained.

All this will take yonks....

This post has been edited by Luig on Sep 27 2013, 07:06 PM
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Ron Cuskelly
Posted: Sep 27 2013, 07:59 PM
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Hi Luig

What application are you using to write your original document? If it's Word, I can recommend a program called easyPDF Printer. It installs as a printer driver so you just print your Word document using the driver and it comes out as a PDF. I have found that it does a better job than Acrobat and copes better with complex tables. With a file size in GB I'm inclined to think that's it's crying out to be broken up into chapters anyway. If you need to make changes to your PDF you just go back and edit the Word master and reprint it as a PDF. Apologies if this does not fit your circumstances.

Rgds
Ron
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Luig
Posted: Sep 27 2013, 11:34 PM
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Ron,
Thanks. I have been in this PDF game as an amateur self taught now for ever since when Windows came along, when I started in DTP for various charitable organisations. Before that I did simple Word Processing in the DOS environment with word processors of the day - shudder.

Perhaps you have not seen my 4.4GB PDF. This has not been made with a word processor or simple PDF making utility. It actually has been made over the decade with many programs; mostly the various versions of Adobe Acrobat available at the time but also including InDesign, which is absolutely the best DTP program available to any beginner/expert (unless the expert already knows the quirks of their own long used DTP program now made obsolete by the power and ease of use of InDesign). I actually now have only the InDesign CS5 and have not upgraded to CS6 because I do not need the new bells and whistles. However I do need whatever I can get from Acrobat. InDesign is set up to automatically make terrific word DTP PDF pages if that is what is needed with little input from the user. It really is excellent. IF one wants to minutely fiddle with every detail then that is possible also.

If it is not clear - I'm testing the new Acrobat - which will become available some time in the near future however at moment I'm using the latest version on sale, which is Adobe Acrobat Pro 11. It is a very powerful program. For a long time Acrobat has had OCR ability; whereas earlier versions years ago did not. Then a special OCR program had to be purchased to do OCR etc. I have been there done that. I have scanned a zillion pages to make them into WP documents to then turn them into DTP pdfs usually. I have done foreign languages, that I do not even understand, and had to proofread them. This sort of work I have given up; and all done for free. Why?

Because I have been doing the 4.4GB PDF. Try downloading it and then resaving it. I won't say more because you will not be able to do it. Not because I have prevented it - which is possible - but because this 4.4GB PDF has become uneditable in the form it is in at present.

Anyway back to the story. Over this decade many different forms of PDF pages have been amalgamated into the 4.4GB PDF - a lot of pages have been removed to be replaced by better more relevant material. So it goes.

Some of these pages came from sources unknown/known or method of making the page not known. Not that it matters a lot except for this one problem page.

I think I know what I need to do and I have done it over the years but somehow the problem page crept in putting a spanner in the works literally.

IF and a big IF - IF I had all the material in the 4.4GB PDF available in one spot and THEN decided to make the PDF I would use a constant program and method. InDesign makes terrific PDF pages but at a penalty of a larger file size. Early on I gave up on it except to make many word / text only pages that you will see in the PDF. Some single text only pages have been made with a very simple file size efficient method also.

A lot of pages have been made from web pages with the various iterations of Acrobat and this is how the problem page happened unbeknownst to me (a long story).

Believe you me a word processor or simple PDF making printer program cannot cope with the content in the 4.4GB PDF. It came to be that size because the PDF can be archived on a DVD. Have thought about making it larger, to be able to be archived on an 8GB DVD, but once you start to resave a 4.4GB PDF over several years - which can take forever to complete - one starts to think - NOPE I'm not going to make the PDF larger.

I have now a year old computer that was the fastest available then and resaving the 4.4GB PDF still takes anywhere from 10 to 15 minutes depending on what I have done to it. Resaving ensures that junk is thrown out and file size reduced where possible. Simple saves take a long time anyway also. So it goes.

Way back in the early days of Windows I used Word. It was tedious to use with large DTP style documents and often would crash leaving all the previous hard won formatting a mess. Yes I had backups but even so Word Programs should not be used for DTP. I have tried all the mainstream DTP programs over the years except QUARK. I even used Adobe Framemaker, which for its time was marvellous and always reliable (not crashing) but it had too little in the way of bells/whistles.

Any DTP program which uses 'frames' for text/graphics is usually going to be the best (for price). Once InDesign came along (version 1 was crap but quickly improved with V 1.5 and beyond) I have not looked back, although I do very little proper DTP these days.

So Acrobat it is. I take cropped TIF graphics at an appropriate pixel size and make them directly into PDF pages suitable for viewing on screen / web. My PDFs are not for printing. That sort of print quality is way beyond my input quality and needs. Text documents are usually made into .RTF format imported into InDesign if multi pages required.

If anyone is serious about making PDFs they at least need Acrobat. Yes there are free PDF making programs. Even Windows 8 will make PDF pages for you but that is not what I need. BTW currently I'm using Windows 8 etc.

What is terrific about Acrobat 11 is that EDITING PDF pages is now a breeze. From early days this editing was always problematic. If one did not have the original document which was made into the problematic PDF page then that was that often. Now I can do anything I like editing wise. There were expensive Acrobat addon utilities to do this work earlier but I'm a cheapskate. Anyway as you can guess I think the combination of Acrobat 11 Pro and InDesign are the best available programs and real value for money if good PDF pages are required as output. BTW I have spent countless hours 'improving' poor graphics to make into PDF pages you see. You may think that these pages are still crap but I know they have been 'improved'. :-)
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Luig
Posted: Sep 27 2013, 11:45 PM
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Ron, this thing about 'breaking the PDF into "chapters"' is not what is required.

The purpose of a single PDF (even though it is very large) is to have internal links so that the viewer is able to jump from page to page internally as required. Also having an extensive bookmark panel for all these pages makes navigation a lot easier. Once people get used to view the pages in Adobe Reader 11 for example, they will develop there own shortcuts about how to navigate the PDF. Just viewing / reading the PDF from start to finish will be tedious beyond belief.

There are internal chapters/sections with even a 'table of contents' for the main subject - each individual A4G. It was much easier to have that structure because if you recall the PDF was started with what I had to hand a decade ago; and now I have terabytes of info (not all used of course) with the good bits in the PDF. I must add my thanks to Dave Masterson for his sterling hard work to get content for me out of FAAM (with the help of Windy).

However following your interest is easy and I hope educationally useful if you are not knowledgeable about Naval Aviation or the old RAN FAA fixed wing era.

If you have no interest in these matters then the PDF is 'gobbledegook' as one UK CRAB told me online a while back. I just laugh. WTF? So do not download it if you are not interested in the subject matter. And BTW these are notes - very extensive notes for a book I'm never going to write however anyone else is free to use the content for their own purposes; and they have.

This post has been edited by Luig on Sep 27 2013, 11:47 PM
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Ron Cuskelly
Posted: Sep 28 2013, 09:30 AM
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Luig

Many thanks for that explanation and my apologies if I appeared to be teaching you to suck eggs. The most important thing is that your research will survive and for that I salute you.

Rgds
Ron
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Luig
Posted: Sep 28 2013, 11:53 AM
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Ron, Thanks for the thoughts. There is a lot I could learn about DTP but have not needed to know all that much because it is a complex area to work in with computers. However recent DTP programs have made that task a lot easier so that anyone can produce a good result.

The 4.4GB PDF is made to a very low DTP standard - deliberately - because I have never known where new content will come from and in what form. So I have minimised my work of standardization to a minimum. With popup graphics (some removed now) and a load of embedded videos the PDF really is very complex indeed and bookmarks and internal links and yaddayaddayadda.... B)

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mark
Posted: Sep 28 2013, 01:08 PM
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The dicussion on PDFs, Acrobat etec etc is almost as interesting as the loss
of the Scooter! :)
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Luig
Posted: Sep 28 2013, 06:34 PM
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I'd be happy to answer questions about making complicated PDFs but perhaps on another thread. The present answers to that question could be duplicated there.

However bear in mind I'm self taught, often through bleedin' hours of frustrating trial and error, to fathom out some of the more obscure functions in old versions of Acrobat which are now easy to introduce into PDFs via the latest version Acrobat 11.

What is good with the internet are the Adobe Forums for beginners to ask or search out solutions to problems with PDFs that they may experience. In the days before internet very expensive books/manuals were not adequate for the job. So that is a very good thing to keep in mind if encountering issues.

The most disappointing feature of the last few versions of Acrobat was Adobe dropping support for using .WMV/.MPG/.MPEG video formats in PDFs. They will still play in Windows in Adobe Reader but depending on the viewers Reader (they should always use the latest Adobe Reader version 11.03) they may be disappointed how difficult it can be to get some of the embedded .WMVs to play. Perserverance usually gets it done via the advice at the top of the bookmark column in the 4.4GB PDF.

Also I do not bother with probably most of the features of PDFs not otherwise seen/enabled in that PDF or others. These features may be most worthy to use but 'I'm not bovvered'. B)
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Luig
Posted: Oct 4 2013, 06:54 PM
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Navy News O8 Feb 1963 has this photo and snippet of info [page 6] - bloody hell - I believe the fatalities were the two Sea Venom crew, perhaps caused by aircraft and not catapult, early on during Sea Venom deployment. I'll have to check....

QUOTE
“...her remarkable flying record in the last complete year of fixed wing aviation [1962] earned the award [Duke of Gloucester Cup for 1962] for MELBOURNE.
      During the year, MELBOURNE celebrated her 10,000th catapult launching; in six years since MELBOURNE commenced flying operations, only one fatal accident has occurred in catapult launching operations....”


From the ADF-SERIALS.com website page about Sea Venoms in the RAN: "N4-933 WZ933 FAW.53 12775 27/02/56 207, 207/Y Crashed whilst attached to 808 Squadron, Fatal 08/08/56, Flown by LEUT(P) B.Y Thompson, RAN & LEUT(O) K.C.M Potts, RAN. On being catapulted from HMAS Melbourne crashed into the sea killing the crew."

This post has been edited by Luig on Oct 4 2013, 07:00 PM

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Luig
Posted: Oct 4 2013, 07:03 PM
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I thought I had added info about this Sea Venom accident to confirm that SBLT Clive Blennerhassett was the pilot of this Sea Venom? A 724 Sqdn Line Book page confirms pilot involved.

QUOTE
"N4-904  WZ904 FAW.53  12761  27/02/56  804, 864, 868  Damaged 06/04/65,when with 724 Sqn, Port main undercarriage failed to lower, pilot carried out successful two wheel landing.  Ikara missile trials aircraft. Sold 25/07/66. Townsville Air Museum 10/74. On display Beck Collection, Mareeba QLD."


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Posted: Sep 18 2014, 06:45 PM
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An addition to the loss of 885 story was published recently in the TOUCHDOWN RAN Safety Magazine. This one page PDF is attached. [NOPE cannot be attached so please download it.] SBLT (at that time) Chartier was the Wettex helo rescue pilot (planeguard). I'll post the text from the article anyway.

The Rescue of SBLT David Baddams by DR R CHARTIER, RANR, TOUCHDOWN issue 2 2014

https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files...4_revision1.pdf (1.6Mb)

The Rescue of SBLT David Baddams by DR R CHARTIER, RANR | TOUCHDOWN issue 2 2014

https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files...4_revision1.pdf

The rescue of SBLT David Baddams is etched in my memory and I guess will be for the rest of my life. However, 21 October 1980 was a long time ago so the routine parts of that day are somewhat fuzzy. These include the pre flight sortie briefing and just about everything else of a routine nature.

The aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne had two Wessex Mk 31B helicopters embarked as SAR and utility aircraft. For this particular sortie, our aircraft side number was 834, I was aircraft captain, LS Ray Cully my aircrewman and a member of our maintenance crew, Rick Newman was the SAR diver. We attended the fixed wing (knuckleheads) briefings, most of which involved much hand waving and tactical terminology that was complete gobbledygook to us, so we just sat ‘glazed over’ until it was our turn to brief. When compared to pre flight briefings of today, those in 1980 were pretty casual, although if there was another task involved that was briefed in detail.

The purpose of Plane Guard, as the name suggests, was to act as rescue helicopter for carrier fixed wing take off and landing operations by either S2 Tracker or A4 Skyhawk aircraft. It was a given that we would be airborne solely to rescue ditched aircrew, so we just discussed what we would do if either of us ditched; the same as every other Plane Guard sortie.

It’s probably worth explaining that Plane Guard was probably the most mundane and boring flying one could do, so if you’d flown one, you’d flown them all. It involved a launch, typically from six spot (the most aft helo spot on the ship) and then a quick transit to a 40 foot hover, maintaining a position about 400m off the ship’s port quarter. On completion, a radio call “Pedro to Six Spot” was our signal to return. Sortie duration was based on the time it took for fixed wing take off/landing operations to be completed and many were recorded as just 0.2 hrs (12 mins).

Despite the mundane nature of this task, we paid particular attention to all of these activities. Each landing was slightly different, with some landings involving much wing waving or anxious calls from the LSO. Not all intended landings resulted in an arrest but could involve a wave off or a ‘bolter’ - where the arrestor hook skipped over the five arrestor wires and the aircraft would apply full power and get airborne to try again. Bolters were the exception rather than the rule, although the junior pilots had quite a number until experience in this art took effect.

By very nature, the fixed wing circuit with the possibility of a ‘wave off’ or ‘bolter’ on landing meant the Plane Guard position was restricted to the port quarter. However, for sorties that involved just take offs, I would often sneak up to a position about 100m abeam the catapult in order to watch the launches, adding some interest to an otherwise brain numbing flight.

I’m pretty certain that the ‘Baddams Incident’ occurred late in the morning as we’d already flown twice that day; a 0.5 hr Plane Guard and a 0.5hr transfer to HMAS Stalwart, so this was just another flight. On this occasion, as it involved only A4 launches, I decided when airborne to move to abeam the catapult to watch. I can’t remember how many launches had already occurred, but the procedure was as follows:

• The aircraft moved from its parking position, to the catapult shuttle

• Over the catapult, the holdback ‘bolt’ was attached to a receptacle under the arrestor hook

• The catapult launch strop was attached to the launch hooks

• The blast deflector was raised, allowing full power, shielding people and aircraft further aft

• Final checks complete, the pilot saluted the Flight Deck Officer to indicate launch readiness; and

• The catapult hurled the aircraft down the deck to become airborne in about two seconds flat.

On this particular launch, all proceeded as normal apart from the last item. The aircraft just moved slowly down the catapult track and my heart immediately went into overdrive! While the two guys in the back could see what was happening, I instinctively yelled to them “Get ready guys!”

As the doomed Skyhawk approached the edge of the flight deck, the radio came alive with an urgent, “Eject! Eject! Eject!” This was LCDR Errol Kavanagh (LCDR Flying - known as Little F) who manned the tower and watched everything. Immediately the aircraft canopy flew off very closely followed by the ejection seat shooting skywards. I distinctly remember arms and legs flailing as the seat ascended before the parachute canopy with its ballistic spreaders blossomed. This flailing seemed somewhat comical at the time. Comical it was not!

It’s amazing how many things run through your mind in situations such as this. I immediately realised that we were way too close. Why? I had the very strong perception that the pilot in his parachute was going to drift into our rotor disk. I realised that this was why the Plane Guard was really supposed to be stationed off the port quarter. I immediately flew away to the left into an orbit with the intent of returning to where the pilot would be waiting to be rescued; meanwhile the ship kept travelling forward.

Returning to where the survivor (any live person needing rescue was always referred to as a survivor) would be, we were perplexed to find no sign of anything and flew another orbit to locate him. Returning to the hover and scratching our heads as to what had happened, Dave Baddams’ looking somewhat dazed suddenly appeared at the surface. I descended to about 20 feet for Rick to drop into the water to assist Dave into the rescue strop, while Ray prepared for winching.

The expectation was for this to be completed relatively quick, but time dragged and Ray and I were surprised at how long Rick was taking in the water. Meanwhile the ship slowed and remained some distance away. We were in the hover for what seemed like ages, watching Rick working out to our right just outside the rotor wash. I don’t remember much of what occurred during that time except for the regular radio update requests from Little F.

Finally Rick was ready. He and Dave winched aboard in the double lift harness and we recovered to the ship. Whilst inbound, Rick explained that Dave had been completely tangled in his parachute shrouds and it had taken him all that time to cut Dave loose and untangle him before being able to get him into the rescue harness. Of course the ship was ready with the medical team poised for action and upon landing abeam the island, Dave our survivor, was whisked away to the sick bay for examination. I shut down and we all returned to the briefing room.

Looking at my logbook, I reckon the rescue took around 45 minutes as I had recorded it as 1.0 hrs. This was exceptionally long for a routine Plane Guard sortie. I later learnt that following Dave’s ejection he actually landed on top of his aircraft.

Dave’s parachute shrouds then snagged on the aircraft and proceeded to pull him down with it as it sank. This certainly explained why we were unable to see him when we’d completed our initial orbit, and also why he had become so entangled in his parachute shrouds. It would seem that he was a very lucky fellow.

Following a rather formal debrief with our OIC, we stood down. However, my logbook records a further 1.0 hrs flight that day, involving further transfers to HMAS Stalwart and flying a number of external loads to the DDG, HMAS Perth. The rest is Dave Baddams’ story and history. However, for me at the time - a lowly Sub Lieutenant, this rescue was a significant event. I formally qualified as a Knuck Plucker.

Now here we are 34 years later, and the lesson I learned that day is still an important one. Firstly, it’s not good to fly a helicopter close to an aircraft from which the pilot may eject. Secondly, it’s not good to turn away from a survivor in the water - you might just lose them. What could have obviated these two factors was to have been stationed in the assigned position of plane guard, where neither could have been an issue. Regardless of how mundane the task is, conduct it with professionalism and precision. That’s what we get paid for.

Please see Article Extract regarding the loss of Skyhawk 885 from TOUCHDOWN 03/97

LCDR Chartier is awarded $200 cash prize for his article to TOUCHDOWN magazine. Congratulations

This post has been edited by Luig on Sep 19 2014, 03:02 AM
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Invader26
Posted: Sep 19 2014, 11:40 PM
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I was there for this as the CAG SATCO...

DB was one lucky boy....

Remember the sharks in the area just after he was picked up..
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Luig
Posted: Sep 20 2014, 09:39 AM
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G'day, it does not sound like a fun excursion at all. Meanwhile....

This URL will take you download/preview option for the 4.4GB PDF dated 19 SEP 2014. The file is too large for Google Preview to function and also too large for anti-virus check (lazy bastards) but anyway the two warnings can be ignored and the complete PDF 4.4GB downloaded:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwBlvCQ7o4...dit?usp=sharing

This PDF is slightly different from the one on OneDrive because it has the Baddams 885 Helo Rescue story in it.

I have seen that a FREE RAR program is available on iTunes and I'll guess the ZIP program if someone with MACs does not have that to re-assemble the 3 .RAR files on OneDrive into same 4.4GB PDF.

FOLDER: __AlmostFinalNewA4Gpdf18sep2014

3 RAR Files: 18sep14A4Gp10047.part1

https://onedrive.live.com/?cid=CBCD63D63407...340707E6%211338

Download the three RAR files to the same folder and double click the first RAR file to reassemble the three parts into one 4.4GB PDF which will be in a new folder called '18sep14A4Gp10047' with the file name: 18sep2014NEWranFAAskyhawkA4Gpp10,047.pdf
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Luig
Posted: Sep 27 2014, 02:55 AM
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FA-18F Super Hornet (A44)
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Group: ADF Serials Team
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rong place - too early in the mornin'.

This post has been edited by Luig on Sep 27 2014, 09:11 AM
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Luig
Posted: Dec 4 2015, 03:27 AM
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FA-18F Super Hornet (A44)
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Group: ADF Serials Team
Posts: 2,011
Member No.: 80
Joined: 8-March 06



SpazSinbad: The larger PDF file with 142 pages has all the smaller 21 page info PLUS info about HMAS Melbourne catapult and how to catapult Skyhawks

https://onedrive.live.com/?id=root&cid=CBCD63D6340707E6

Folder: RAN FAA A4G Skyhawk PDFs

885baddamsColdCatLoss21nov1980plusPP142.pdf (58.5Mb)

885baddamsColdCatLoss21nov1980pp21.pdf (8Mb)
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